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1. INTRODUCTION 
S ince the publication o f Nora's Ueux de Mémoire some fifteen years ago its has become a common place in corttemporary culture: we live in an age o f commemorations. This should invite us to consider the question 
o f the significance o f commemorations for our time. Should we see 
commemoradons as attracdve and decorative social phenomena but without 
any real import from an academic point o f view? Or is there more about 
commemorations than immediately meets the eye? More specifically, can, or 
do they really add something to our understanding o f the past? Or should 
we agree with Nora that commemorations primarily express something about 
how we relate to the past, while not adding to our understanding o f the past 
itself ? Commemoration expresses or exemplifies a feeling that we have, or 
are expected to have about a past event, and has, as such, its origins exclusively 
in ourselves and not in the past. Or, so it may seem. For this question 
immediately raises a further one: namely the question whether a clear-cut 
distinction can always be made between the issue o f how we relate to, or feel 
about the past, on the one hand, and our understanding o f it on the other. 
Obviously, these feeelings about the past wil l often be associations that we 
have with a past event; and such associations are not necessarily at odds with 
our understanding o f the past and may, sometimes, even importantly contribute 
to it. For example, the associations that survivers o f the Holocaust have with 
this event may well be worth the historian's attention, since these associations 
could embody or suggest a new and unexplored dimension to it. So it could 
well be that commemoration not only shows us how we feel about the past, 
but is also a deposit o f hitherto neglected evidence about the past itself. And 
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there is no apriori reason to believe that the events of a remoter past should 
necessarily be excluded from this. So perhaps commemoration could in certain 
cases be a guide for how to transcend the limits o f existing historical 
understanding. 
These, then, are some o f the topics that I hope to investigate in this 
essay. 
2. T H E TERM 'COMMEMORATION' 
In English the two words 'commemoration" and 'remembrance' can 
both be used for our remembering the past. There is a slight difference in 
meaning between the two terms: 'commemoration' is primarily related to 
the act of remembering something, whereas 'remembrance' is more intimately 
associated with the object, or content o f what is remembered. Thanks to this 
performative dimension (to use Austin's terminology) 'commemoration' is 
more suggestive of a social and public event than 'remembrance'. In this 
context it is o f interest to note that French only knows the word 
'commemoration' and has no equivalent o f the word 'remembrance'. I f 
language is a reliable indication o f the social practices of a community of 
language users, as has famously been argued by Peter Winch 1 , it would follow 
that for the French a commemoration is a more solemn and public event 
than for the English. This difference between the two terms is further enhanced 
by the fact that 'commemoration' is a remembering together, whereas 
'remembrance' primarily is a private affair. This fact suggests that we should 
doubt the commonsensical opinion that the contemporary memory cultus 
should conflict with what we expect from history. I t has often been argued — 
for example by Hobsbawm and by Megill 2 — that memory is private and 
uncertain, whereas history is public and, because of this, the repository of 
truth. But the foregoing suggests already that things are more complicated 
and that since memory is not necessarily private it might, in principie, share in 
the public revelation o f truth. Unless, o f course, one were to postulate a 
necessary connection between memory and falsity. But the fact that memory 
may often delude us, does not warrent the extrapolation that it ahvays does so. 
Both the English and the French variants derive from the Ladn verb 
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'commemorare', in which the emphasis is on the act o f remembering. 
'Commemorare' means both 'to recall to memory' and 'to remind somebody 
of something', and in both cases the act o f remembering and not its object is 
at stake. 'Commemorare' and its English and French derivates are therefore 
halfway between memory itself and its object or content, on the one hand, 
and a reminding of, on the other, as in, for example, 'this building reminds 
me o f as cigarbox'. Here we may also discem the semantic affínity between 
'commemorare' and its English and French derivates on the one hand and 
the Latin word 'monumentum' on the other. This Latin word is derived 
from 'moneo' meaning 'ali that reminds somebody o f something'. The 
monument therefore is not itself the incorporation or expression of a memory, 
but has a merely intermediary function. We have learned to associate a certain 
memory with a monument; but some other monument could fulfil this task 
just as well, or may-be even better. The monument is, in this way, much like a 
word or sign that also ties a meaning to a thing, but which is itself a wholly 
arbitrary device for doing so. 
'Commemoration' therefore presents us with a semanric tryptich. I n 
the first place commemoration may suggest remembrance in the sense that 
somebody recalls something to memory. In this case the subject of the act of 
memory and the person in whose mind a memory is evoked are identical. 
And this even is necessarily the case here since my memories are suigeneris not 
identical with those o f others persons, even i f we recall ourselves the same 
events. Memories, like thoughts, are always tied to persons and do not float 
in some im- or intra-personal limbo. I cannot recall your memories, for the 
simple reason that your memories are necessarily yours, even i f their content 
does not differ in any way from those o f mine. In opposidon to this we have 
the 'reminding of ' effected by the monument; here the thing that eyokes the 
memory — i.e. the monument — must be distinguished from the person or 
persons in whom a memory has been evoked. A monument does not 
remember itself something, but it may make us remember something. These 
two opposed meanings o f 'reminding o f ' can be dramarized in the paradox 
that ' I may remind you o f something or somebody without reminding you 
of something or somebody'. That is to say, I can draw your attention to 
something that you should remember, without evoking, as a person, any 
special memories in you. Lastly, and in the third place, between 'recalling to 
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memory' and 'reminding of ' lies 'commemorare' (and their English and French 
derivarives) combining elements o f both. And this is at it ought to be. For 
what we expect o f a commemoradon is that it makes us recall by reminding 
us of something. There is, first, the phase o f reminding and only then, will 
memories present themselves to us. Without reminders, memories wil l not 
be 'acrivated', so to say. And we can only admire the genius o f language by so 
appropriately combining these two things in the notion of'commemoration'. 
Next, German is a case apart. Let us, for a moment play Heidegger's 
game and try to connect some philosophical insights to the etymological 
peculiarides o f the German language. There is, in German, in the first place 
the neutral term 'Erinnerung' and, next to it, the more specific nodons of 
'das Andenken' and o f 'das Gedáchtnis ' . I t must strike us that these German 
words, unlike their English and French equivalents, associate memory and 
monument with 'denken', hence with thought and are, moreover, remarkably 
free from associadons with pastness. Furthermore, it lacks the public and 
performat ive d imension we found to be so clearly present in 
'commemoradon' or 'commemoradon'. Andenken' and 'Gedáchtnis ' seem 
rather to belong to the private sphere o f the human individual. Apparendy, 
when commemorating something in Germany, one primarily does so 
individually rather than collectively. Here the Germans show themselves, 
once again, to be 'das berühmte Volk der Innerlichkeit', to quote Nietzsche3. 
This may suggest, next, that the nationalist collectivism in recent German 
history has in ali likelihood been a forced and extremist attempt to overcome 
a characterisdc o f the German mind rather than an expression o f this 
characterisdc. And this might explain why this German collecdvism could 
take on such nasty features. For people are always at their worst, when they 
do not coincide with themselves. 
3. RETHTNKING AND RELTVING 
Commemoration brings us back to the past and has the pretensiòn to 
momentarily achieve a kind o f communion with the past. I t is suggestive o f 
a closeness to the past and o f a directness in our relationship to it that will be 
absent in our more normal interaction with our collective past. I f we 
commemorate some tragic past o f our colelctive past during a solemn 
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ceremony we are for a moment close to those who fell for the freedom of 
our nation, or to those who were the innocent victíms of the crimes o f the 
past. And this raises the obvious question to what extent the past is actually 
're-lived' at such occasions. 
I f so, our experience o f such ceremonies would come close to 
Collingwood's well-known argument in his The idea of history about the 
epistemological conditions o f historical knowledge. C~!lingwood required 
of the historian 'a re-enactment o f the past in his own mind'. For i f the 
historian wishes to explain the actions o f individual statesmen or generais, he 
should, according to Collingwood, re-live the past in exactly the same way as 
its relevant aspects presented themselves to the historical agent. In this sense 
the distance separating the historian from his object should temporarily4 be 
undone by the historian. 
However, when we commemorate something from the past, there can 
be no question o f a 're-enactment o f the past' in the Collingwoodian sense; 
for the past may well be the occasion of, or the object o f commemoration 
but no effort is made to diminish, let alone to destroy the distance between 
the present and the relived past. On the contrary, commemoration only makes 
sense on the basis o f the distance of fifty, one hundred , twohundred years 
etc. that separate us from the commemorated past. We commemorate the 
past precisely because o f the distance between i t and the present. 
Commemoration has a different raison d'être and relates to a different experience 
of the past, than what is suggested by the notion o f 'reliving the past'. 
This does not exclude that a reliving of the past may be part of the 
commemoration o f the past. Commemorations o f certain events o f the 
Second World War, such as D-Day, the Holocaust, the resistance against the 
Nazi's or o f the Liberation may invite in people who participated in these 
events a re-living o f these events. And for them the commemorated past 
may then come quite close again. But even these people will not actually 
relive the past in the Collingwoodian sense. For the quite real and intense 
feelings that they wil l then have with regard to these events wil l be feelings 
about these events, feelings that they have about the past from the perspective 
of the present, but certainly not a reproduction of the feelings they had 
during these events themselves. They wil l then experience feelings about 
feelings, though I should immediately add that feelings about feelings may 
sometimes be no less intense than the original feelings occasioning them. 
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Remorse is a good example: remorse may start with the feeling that we did 
something wrong in the post, but then this feeling of regret may start to have 
a life of its own and develop into a feeling about this inirial feeling of regret. 
And as such it may begin to dominate our frame of mind that is wholly out 
of propordon with the event itself. 
And so it is with history. For in history it may also happen that these 
'secondary' feelings become more intense than the 'primary' ones. A striking 
example is the first commemoradon o f the Fali o f the Bastille in July 1790 — 
I shall return lateron to later nineteenth century commemorations o f July 
14th. Justly famous is Michelet's hyperbolic account o f this first 
commemoradon in his Histoire de Ia Répolution Française. Precisely because of 
Michelet's intendon to identify himself completely with this commemoration 
and to present in his account a true 'résurrection' of the event - precisely 
because o f this can his account bring us closest to the enthusiasm that must 
have inspired this first commemoration. 'Gleiches durch Gleiches', to quote 
Nietzsche. What must strike us in Michelet's account is how commemoration 
and reliving are inextricably bound up in this case, and how this made this 
first commemoration o f July 14th 1789 into an event paradoxically surpassing 
the commemorated event itself in symbolic meaning and significance. Michelet 
himself is well aware o f this and this may explain why, in his opinion, the 
essence o f the French Revolution could announce itself more clearly in this 
first commemoration o f july 14th than in any other event of the period. The 
counter-intuitive fact suggested by Michelet is, therefore, that the essence of 
the Revolution is to be found in a commemoration, and, even more so, in 
one that took place when the Revolution still had to get under its way. This 
commemoration, spontaneous, emanating from the most vivid and authentic 
awareness of the commemorated event is truly here a résurrection à la Michelet 
of the past in a way that history — let alone historical wridng — is rarely, i f ever 
capable of producing. The commemoration here becomes more real and 
more intense than what is commemorated and the re-lived past becomes 
more actual than the past itself. 
'Un sentiment inoui de paix, de concorde, avait pénétré les ames'5, thus 
Michelet when wridng about this commemoration: ali o f France, yes even ali 
o f Europe had its eyes turned to Paris on this july 14th 1790 in the awareness 
that the revolutionary élan, and the unity and fraternizadon o f the French on 
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that day, announced the birth o f a new epoch in the history o f mankind: 
'Cette foi, cette candeur, cet immense élan de concorde, au bout d'un siècle de 
disputes, ce fut pour toutes les nations 1'objet d'un grand étonnement comme 
un prodigieux rêve' 6. 
In this way the 'Fête de la Fédérat ion' , as this first commemoradon of 
the Fali o f the Bastille was to be known, became so much the realizadon of 
the ideal of nadonal unity that Michelet considered to-be the essence of the 
French Revoludon, that the commemorated event itself lost its logical priority 
to its commemoration. By a paradoxical inversion it now looked as i f july 
14th 1789, the Fali o f the Bastille itself, acquired the character o f a 
commemoradon, o f a commemorative anticipation o f what would take 
place only one year later in the 'Fête de Fédération'. Charles Péguy, who was 
in his socialist phase no less a mythologist of the French Revoludon than 
Michelet had been, expressed this inversion as follows : 
'la prise de la Bastille, dit l'histoire, ce fut proprement une fête, ce fut la première 
célébration, la première commemoration at pour ainsi dire le premier anniversaire 
de la prise de la Bastille. Ou enfin le zeroième anniversaire. On s'est trompé, dit 
l'histoire. On a vu dans un sens, il fallait voir dans 1'autre. On a vu. Ce n'est pas 
la fête de la Fédération qui fut la première commemoration, le premier anniversaire 
de la prise de la Batille. Oest la prise de la Bastille qui fut la première fête de la 
Fédération, une Fédération avant la lettre'7. 
Indeed, the perspective has been reversed and july 14th 1789 now 
became birthday 'number zero' o f itself or, rather, the 'minus first' 
commemoration of the "Fête de Fédération' . And in this way the simulacrum 
of the relived commemoradon could come to outshine even an event such 
as the Fali o f the Bastille. 
4. T H E RELIGIOUS ORIGINS O F COMMEMORATION 
There is one more element in Michelet's account o f this first 
commemoration o f july 14th that will demand our attendon. Lionel Gossman 
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has emphasized that for Michelet the French Revolution has been an event of 
an almost religious significance8. And it is undoubtedly true that Michelet, 
despite his hatred o f religion as the ideological support of polidcal repression, 
deliberately uses a religious vocabulary in his exposidon of the 'Fête de 
Fédération' . He compares France to the Infant Christ on the altar, miracles 
occur such as octogenarian sailors who suddenly recuperate the energy of 
their youth and the no less amazing miracle of Kant who abandons his daily 
rhythm in order to hear the latest news from France — and ali this is expounded 
to the reader in two chapters entided 'De la religion nouvelle'. I n this mood 
of religious exaltation that Michelet ascribed to the French in 1790, a higher 
and trans- tempotal reality announces itself such as the one promised to the 
believer in the true creed. 'Le temps a péri, 1'espace a péri, ces deux conditions 
matcrielles auxquelles la vie est soumise' - and i f Michelet argues here for the 
abrogation o f the dimension o f time, this may lend extra force to this 
inversion o f the commemorated past and its commemoration that we 
observed a moment ago. The concepts 'before' and 'after' have lost their 
meaning and can no longer determine the relationship between the past and 
its commemoration. 
This religious dimension Michelet projects on commemoration will lead 
us to Freud's speculations about what one may well see as the archetype o f ali 
commemoration: namely Freud's account of the origins of society as depicted 
in his Totem und Tabu. According to Freud society carne into being after the 
slaying o f the primeval father by his sons who wished to put an end his 
sexual dominion over the females of the tribe. A l i that we see as essendal to 
society, conscience, social organization and social cohesion, the internalization 
o f social norms, sexual repression, religion, the incest taboo etc. was not 
implausibly related by Freud to the drama o f this murder o f the primeval 
father. And, as Freud goes on to say: 
'Die Totemmahlzeit, vielleicht das erste Fest der Menschheit, wàre die 
Wiederholung und die Gedenkfeier dieser Gedenkwürdigen, verbrecherischen 
Tat, mit welcher soviel ein Anfang nahm, die soziale Organisation, die sittliche 
Einschrànkungen und die Religion'9 
Hence, in this first commemoration in the history of mankind, and that 
would ritually be re-enacted ad infinitum nothing less is celebrated than the 
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birth o f society itself. Commemoration is thus, right from the beginning, 
inextricably tied up with taboo, ethics, the internalization of social norms, 
hence with the strongest and most important foundations of ali society. So ali 
the elements that we may hope to discover in the phenomenon o f 
commemoradon can be retraced by establishing their place and funcdon in 
Freud's story about the origins o f society. And this is also where we can find 
out about the mutual relationships between these elements. Thus, as is suggested 
by Freud's myth, this repertory o f elements includes the ceremony o f the 
commemoration, the endlessly repeated rituais, the effort to let the 
commemoration be the equivalent o f the commemorated event and the 
foundationalist potential o f the commemoration in the double sense o f 
founding society and o f sacralizing its origins. In sum, within Freud's 
conception the commemoration is most intimately bound up with religion 
and we should be profoundly aware o f this in order to properly grasp the 
psychological and the sociological properties o f the phenomenon o f 
commemoration. 
Pierre Nora himself has also recognized this religious dimension o f 
commemora t ion as w i l l be obvious f r o m his characteristic o f 
commemorations as 'des sacra l i tés pas sagè res dans une société qui se 
désacra l i se" 0 . And sactality and religion wil l not have lost their hold o f 
commemoradon in a society like ours that still has so many reminiscences of 
its Christian past. Hence Jacques Le Goff: Tenseigement Chrétien est donc 
mémoire et le culte Chrétien est commemoration' 1 1. The Christian background 
of our civilization not only contributed to our love of commemoration, but 
has also confirmed its religious dimensions. 
5. COMMEMORATION, REPETITION AND DECONTEXTUALIZATION 
The close relationship observed by Freud between commemoration 
on the one hand and ritual repetition is amply confirmed by the organizarion 
of the Ecclesiastical Year. The Ecclesiastical Year is, amongst other things, the 
yearly repeated series o f commemorations o f the crucial events o f the gospel 
as told to the believers. Each year Christ is born anew and each year He dies 
again on the cross for the remission o f our sins. And each time that such an 
event is commemorated the suggestion really is that, in a certain sense, the 
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commemorated events happen again. But o f importance in the present 
context is the fact that in this recurring commemoration historical reality is 
robbed o f its original cohesion and subjected, instead to the ritual and the 
schematism of the commemoration. To return to the present example, the 
cohesion of Christ's life, the way He lived it, is abandoned for the fixed 
schematism of the Ecclesiastical Year. The major events of his life, as recounted 
in the gospel, are detached from their original context, their chronological 
order is abandoned now that to each o f them is assigned a fixed place and 
date in the Ecclesiastical Year. 
And precisely here each commemoration, however sublime or humble, 
shows itself to be the heir of the religious commemoration — its primeval 
prototype. For just as with these major events o f the gospel, so does 
commemotation ordinarily introduce a schematism that is alien to what is 
commemorated and to the past itself. Crucial is here the recognition that the 
commemoration always complies with the compulsion of round numbers. 
For example, Mozart's death was commemorated not in 1985, or in 1995 
but in 1991 when his death was exacdy two hundred years ago. And probably 
one wil l decide to commemorate his death again in 2041 or in 2091, but not 
in some arbitrarily chosen year somewhere in between. Hence, the relationship 
between the commemorated event and its commemoradon (and between 
commemoradons mutually) is not determined by any logic or aspect of the 
historical process itself, but exclusively by our preference for the convenience 
o f round years and for the logic of lustrums. And this has its grounds in the 
contingent fact that we have five fingers on both our hands and — obviously 
- íbis fact has nothing to do w i th history in general nor wi th the 
commemorated event itself. 
The direct occasion for commemoradon therefore is a-historical and 
exemplifies a double de-contextualizadon. This will be clear i f we realize 
ourselves that in commemoration the crucial axis is the axis between the 
commemorated event, on the one hand, and us who commemorate, on the 
other. And this axis cuts right across ali contextualizations that history would 
demand us to respect. For in the first place the commemorated event is now 
taken out o f its own historical context and considered exclusively in terms 
of its relationship to us. In the second place we also de-contextualize ourselves 
with this same movement insofar as our historical present is temporarily 
narrowed down to a fixation on the commemorated event. And in both 
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cases the brutality of this double de-contexnaalization is symbolized by the 
sacrifice o f the richness of historical context itself to the attracrions of round 
numbers. 
But this is only half of the story. The human mind is associative and 
feels an irresisrible need of contextualization. Afguably nothing is more unnatural 
to us and demands a greater intellectual exertion than the effort not to relate 
something to something else — we hardly ever succeed in doing this and our 
invincible desire of contextualizadon will almost always gain the victory. 
Probably this is part of the explanadon o f why mathemadcs is so difficult 
for most people; for mathematics requires o f us an effort o f de-
contexualization by means o f the most rigorous abstraction and that 
completely defies our natural propensity to contextualizadon. I n this way 
mathematics is a discipline which is at odds with what one might call 'the 
logic of our mind'. If , then, we combine this with the de-contextualization 
effected by commemoration that we discussed a moment ago, this may further 
contribute to our understanding of the nature of commemoradon. 
Perhaps this can best be expressed by means of the following metaphor. 
Compare our memory to a slate. Ordinarily this slate is written ali over already 
and it will most often be difficult to find an open and still inoccupied place 
for wridng down our new experiences. We shall then have to write the memory 
of these new experiences over something else that was already written down 
somewhere on the slate — hence the complexity and the chãos of our memory. 
And where it also differs so conspicuously from the memories of our PCs 
where we have well-defined maps for ali our old and new documents. De-
contextualizadon can, in this metaphor, best be compared to our wiping 
clean of a litde corner on the slate. Because o f this the experiences we may 
have, just after having created some clean corner on the slate, will preferably 
be written down there. We have made there some empty space, after ali. And 
this will produce a condngent, but, nevertheless quite intimate and almost 
indestructible relationship between what is commemorated and the kind of 
experiences we contingently happen to have when commemorating 
something. In short, it is part o f the nature of commemoration to tie in this 
way 'macro-historical' events o f the historical and polidcal past to the 'micro-
events' o f our personal life and that happened to occur when we were 
commemorating something. If , then, we conceive o f commemoration as a 
form of collective memory, we will have every reason to agree with David 
Lowenthal when he writes that 'memory converts public events into 
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idiosyncratic personal experiences"2. 
Something similar can be observed for statues and monuments — no 
less prototypkal of Nora's lieux de mémoire than the commemoration. Take a 
statue. I t ordinarily stands somewhere right in the middle of the busde of a 
large city where absolutely nothing reminds us o f the historical personality 
who is honored by the statue. This contextlessness o f the statue may thus 
bring about that the public, insofar as it is aware at ali o f the presence o f the 
statue, will be inclined to subsume the statue in the context of its daily roudne 
without there being anything in the statute itself, or in the collective memory 
it incorporates in stone or in bronze, that could effectively resist this. The 
statue is a kind of protuberance of the past in the present and where the past 
and the present 'meet', while having turned there back to each other, so to 
speak. In this sense the statue is the helpless victim of ali that we can project 
on it with impunity. As Diderot recognized already, by its imperturbable 
contexdessness the statue is an object that meekly and passively adapts itself 
to even our most capricious desires o f contextualization. 'Diderot himself 
had great reverence for statues', thus Banville: 
'he thought of them as living somehow; strange, solitary beings, exemplary, 
aloof, closed on themselves and at the same time yearning in their mute and 
helpless way to step down in our world, to laugh or weep, know happiness and 
pain, to be mortal, like us. "Such beautiful statues", he wrote in a letter to his 
mistress Sophie Volland, "hidden in the remotest spots and distant from one 
another, statues which call to me, that I seek out and encounter. That arrest me 
and with which I have long conversations'13. 
Precisely this readiness to start playing a role in our conversations and to 
be carried along in our preoccupations is a fact that can be ruthlessly exploited 
for the 'invention o f tradirion' and for the construction and enhancement o f 
nadonal identity. I mention an example. When the celebration of July 14th 
was introduced in France in 1880, the government decided that the 
schoolvacations should also begin at that very same date. I t is easy to imagine 
that in this way a kind o f conflation was effected o f the prospect o f being 
ftee for two months from homework and from stuffy class-rooms, on the 
one hand, and the freedom that had been promised by the Revoludon and in 
terms o f which the Third Republic wished to legitimate itself on the other. 
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Here we will find the function that statues and commemorations may have 
for the constitution o f a national identity or for the legitimization o f a certain 
ideology, politics or of a specific regime — hence for the kind of thing that 
has so intensely been discussed since the publication of Nora's studies on the 
'lieux de mémoi re ' 1 4 . 
However, the de-contextualization by the compulsion o f the round 
numbers observed a moment ago is not free from its ironies. Indeed, human 
memory is constituted by contextualization and determined by a complex 
and ever-changing web of associations. The anomymous author of the Ad 
Herennium, the treatise that determined Western thought about memory for 
almost two thousand years, was very much aware of this fundamental aspect 
of memory and it was here that he hoped to find the answer to the question 
of how to optimize the capacities o f our memory. 'Constat igitur artificiosa 
memória ex locis et imaginibus' (artificial memory is constructed out o f places 
and images) — thus the author o f the Ad Herenniumxb. That is to say, memory 
has its best and most reliable support in the association o f what is to be 
remembered with certain spadal representations, places and other images 
already present in our mind. Hence, by the way, this nodon o f the 'lieu de 
mémoire ' . We should realize, then, that association is the most egalitarian and 
and-elirist faculty o f our mind. Unlike Reason, association does not connect 
what has equal rank; on the contrary, association has a natural affinity with the 
mésalliance. Reason is aristocratic and class-conscious, whereas association is 
democratic and the leveller par excelllence o f ali our mental faculties. 
Association has no respect for what we respect most and it does not hesitate 
to connect the sublime and the most august with the banal and the trivial. I n 
his associations even the most narrow-minded and boring neurodc may be 
no less fascinating than the greatest artist or poet. 
A n illustrative example of this democracy o f association and, hence, o f 
memory is the assassination o f Kennedy in november 1963, and the question 
often asked in this connection 'do you still remember where you were when 
you heard about the assassination of Kennedy?' The unintended consequence 
o f this contemporary mnemotechnical link between memory and place is 
that a shift is effected from the object or content o f memory to the place that 
we associate with the memory in question. We tend to become more intrigued 
by the fact that we were at that time at a specific place than by the remembered 
fact itself. Put differendy, the support of the recollection may then become 
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stronger than the remembered fact itself. And something similar will have 
taken place with those nineteenth century French schoolchildren to whom 
each year their liberty was restored for several months onju ly 14th. Certainly 
this wil l have contributed to their sympathies for the Great Revoludon and 
for the Third Republic so emphatically presenting itself as the heir of july 
14th 1789. Pavlov would not have organized it differendy. But the effect 
aimed at by the regime produced a confladon o f contexts — that o f the 
Ftench revolution and that of freedom from school for two months and the 
prospect o f a vacation on the beach o f Deauville or at the Bassin of Arcachon. 
However, this confladon of contexts could just as well work in the wrong 
way. And in such a case the unintended result wil l be that the association of 
july 14th with the prospect o f a vacation wil l trivialize the Revolution and 
revolutionary ideology, instead o f enhancing and cultivating it. The prospect 
of a vacation then no longer contributes to the Revolution's prestige, but 
reduces it to the homely levei of the school-vacadon. Just as in the Kennedy 
example the historical sublime is then infected by everyday life instead of the 
reverse — and it is impossible to predict whether association will lead up to 
the sublime or downwards to the world o f everyday life. 
Selfevidendy this mechanism, occluding the commemorated event behind 
associations that are irrelevant for the commemorated event, may also be 
effective on a macro-scale. Once again an example. The Eiffel Tower was 
constructed in 1889 at the occasion o f the World Exposition that was organized 
that year in Paris in order to celebrate the one hundredth anniversary o f the 
French Revolution. So initially the idea was to anchor the memory of the 
French Revolution as deep as possible in the French mind by such an 
exttaordinary structure as the Eiffel Tower. However, now, more than one 
hundred years later, few people still know what originally was the occasion 
for the building the tower. And in this way the extraordinary height of the 
tower is a striking metaphor o f the extent to which the the reinforcement of 
a collective memory may stand supreme above the commemorated past 
itself. 
This dialectics o f memory was already recognized at the time, as becomes 
clear from the fact that was aware o f the dilemma o f ' commémore r ou 
célébrer ' , as Pascal Ory so succincdy put i t 1 6 . For apart o f the need to 
commemorate the French Revolution, there also existed, what Ory refers to 
as 'un volontar isme c é l é b r a t i f and wh ich made one see in the 
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commemoration o f the Revolution little more than a welcome occasion for 
celebrating the triumphs of nineteenth century science and technology. In this 
way one would celebrate the nineteenth century rather than the French 
Revoludon — an objection that was contested at the dme with the somewhat 
hypocritical argument that ali nineteenth century sciendfic progress had its 
roots in the French Revolution 1 7. The question now arose how these two 
elements had best be balanced. And though one sincerely tried to find the 
juste milieu between 'commemoration' and 'célébration' , it can not be denied 
that in 1889 a fust step had been made into the direcdon o f a complete 
contemporanization of this festivity. In this way the commemoration of the 
Revolution degenerated into litde more than a welcome occasion for a day 
off, some collective fun and the enticing prospect o f ending this day in 
somebody else's bed. July 14th now lost ali capacity of breathing some new 
and ideological life into the memory of an important historical event such as 
the French Revolution. 'Le rituel devenu routinier s'accomplit chaque année 
dans une ambiance touristique qui parait apriori dépourvue depuis longtemps 
déjà de tout caractère partisan et militant' 1 8. Thus Christian Amalvi in his history 
o f the commemoration of July 14th. 
6. COMMEMORATION AND T H E WRITING O F HISTORY 
In this phase of my argument it may be helpful to disdnguish between 
two kinds of commemoration. Compare the commemoration of july 14th, 
as discussed a moment ago, with, for example, the commemoration of the 
discovery o f America in 1994, or with the two hundredth anniversary of the 
publication o f Adam SmitiVs Wealth oj Nations in 1976. In commemorations 
such as those o f july 14th the feeling of solidarity with some conspicuous 
event in the national past gradually fades away; and sometimes each attempt 
is even abandoned to call attention to the commemorated event. This is 
different with the other type o f commemoradon; for here the aim is to 
rescue something from oblivion. Here ali the spotlights are focussed on the 
commemorated event. The difference between the two kinds o f 
commemoradon can best be expressed in terms o f the notion of 'collective 
memory'. In both cases collective memory is central. But whereas the kind o f 
commemoration as exemplified by the festivities o f July 14th is nourished by 
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what collective memory we still have o f July 14th 1789, the other kind of 
commemoradon tries to add a new item to collecdve memory — for example, 
by attempting to show that the writings by Adam Smith have most importandy 
contributed to the birth of the modern world and that we therefore have 
every reason to honour this great man at the occasion o f the two hundredth 
anniversary of the publication o f his magnum opus in 1776. This is also where 
such a commemoration differs from, for "example, a conference on Adam 
Smith. The organizers o f such a conference may be no less convinced of the 
importance Smith's intellectual legacy — nevertheless, they apparendy do not 
endeavor to include Adam Smith in our collecdve memory. Their interest is 
exclusively historical. 
But we may now ask ourselves, what is fot ali pracrical purposes the 
difference between a commemoration o f Adam Smith in 1976, on the one 
hand, and a conference at some other rime devoted to his work and influence 
on the other? Suppose that we have two collections o f papers of which one 
was written for commemoradon o f Adam Smith in 1976 whereas the other 
contains the papers of a conference that took place, let's say, in 1993? Apart 
from the title page and the introduction there may well be no appreciable 
difference. O f course one might argue 1976 will have produced more books 
and collections on Smith than the year 1993, so the difference might well be 
the difference between existence and non-existence. And this is obviously no 
small difference. But this does not yet answer the question in what way both 
collections o f papers may be expected to differ. 
In order to deal with this question it will be helpful, once again, to recall 
the notion o f collective memory. We owe this notion to Maurice Halbwachs 
who developed in the interbellum a theory on collective memory that still is 
the point o f departure of most reflections on memory and commemoration. 
For Halbwachs each memory essentially is a collective memory and there are 
no individual memories in the strict sense o f the word. His argument for this 
surprising claim is that we always mistakenly infer the non-collective character 
o f memory from its complexity. Since memory is so tremendously complex, 
we tend to believe that the abstractum o f the social collectivity cannot be the 
subject and content of memory — or, at least, only in a derivative sense19. 
Obviously, this is not a very convincing argument. For in the first place, why 
should there be a paralellism between the dichotomy o f the collectivity versus 
the individual on the one hand and the dichotomy o f simplicity versus 
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complexity on the other? Who would wish to contest that personal memories 
can sometimes be quite simple, whereas collective memories may well be 
quite complex? And, secondly, even i f we assume that there should be such 
a thing as collective memory, it does not follow that there could be only 
collective memory. Why shouldn't we have botb individual and collective 
memories?20 
But i f we eliminate this extremism from Halbwach's conceptions, we 
will have at our disposal this most fruitful notion of collective memory. Fruitful 
in this notion is especially the insight that the scope of the notions o f memory 
and of recollection should not be restricted to individual memory and that 
we should attribute a memory to collecdvides, such as nations, social groups 
or professional groups as well. We should realize ourselves that memory and 
recollection often are social conventions, sometimes even intentionally 
produced - as in Hobsbawm's 'invention o f tradition' - by the collectivities 
that we are part of. And that implies the no less surprising and fruitful insight 
that each individual — as the representative o f a certain group — may recall or 
remember in the proper sense o f the word a past that antedaring his or her 
birth. Nobody will dispute that we can recall or remember statements or 
historical narratives about a distant past, but we would normally restrict the 
possibility o f actually recalling or remembering the past to the events that we 
have witnessed ourselves during our lives. You may remember that the Bastille 
fell on July 14th 1789, but you cannot remember the event itself. There is a 
subtle, but nevertheless crucial difference between 'remembering' and 
'remembering that'. 
But in agreement with the logic o f his notion o f collective memory 
Halbwachs extends the domain o f events that we effecdvely can 'remember' 
beyond our birth. He gives as an example o f how he himself still had a 
'collecdve memory' of the atmosphere of the late Romanticism o f half a 
century before his b ir th 2 1 . Collective memory leads its own life, it dies off, 
renews itself and develops in an indefinable limbo between past and present. 
And where it is still alive, the past wi l l still be with us; a direct and immediate 
contact with the past still is open to us. Here we may find at least part o f the 
explanation of the intense nostalgic feelings for a sometimes quite remote 
part of the past that we may find in the effusions of some major representatives 
of the West's cultural tradition. One may think here o f Petrarca's or Hólderlin's 
nostalgia for, respectively, Roman and Greek Antiquity, o f that o f Viollet-le 
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Duc for the Middle Ages or that o f Spengler for the second half o f the 
eighteenth century2 2. And in ali these cases we have to do with a nostalgic 
remembrance o f a past that one cannot have lived through personally. The 
nostalgic past is not yet cut of f from us and from the present and may persist 
in the kind o f individuais that have a specific sensitivity for it. Indeed, it is a 
remembrance o f the past that we should primarily attribute to individuais 
and not to the collectivities that Halbwachs had in mind himself; the gênesis 
o f this kind o f remembrance of the past takes place on the lines of fracture 
between certain collecdve traditions and o f how the historical awareness of 
these individuais articulated itself. Though, indeed, in this way this individual 
remembrance can only come into being against the background of a collecdve 
cultural or historical past that is, in principie, shared by many. 
O f importance now is how Halbwachs distinguishes between collecdve 
memory and the wridng o f history. We may agree with Lowenthal when he 
writes that our first intuition will be that memory is 'inescapable and prima 
fade indubitable', whereas historical wridng is 'contingent' and gropingly tries 
to find its way around in the complexides o f the past23. But as we know 
since Nietzsche and Freud, memory is, above ali, what we want and wish to 
remember. Memory is not 'objecdve' — and therefore in need o f correcdon 
by historical writing. In continuation with this Halbwachs sees some crucial 
differences between memory -.nd historical wridng. Firstly, historical wridng 
periodizes the past in more or less closed temporal wholes, whereas memory 
knows o f no such clear demarcations. Second, historical writing strives for 
clarity and synthesis, whereas memory is as multiple as there are social groups 
entertaining a specific relationship to the past24. Nora follows here in Halbwach's 
steps when claiming a straightforwardly antithetic relationship between 
collective memory and the writing o f history. Though this may not be the 
purpose of the wridng o f history, its effect is, nevertheless, according to 
Nora, to correct memory as deceitful and fraudulent — and as such it is a 
'délégit imation du passe vécu ' 2 5 . 
But this distinction between memory and historical writing goes deeper 
than these observadons at first sight seem to suggest. For we should recall 
now that (collective) memory should be related not to knowledge about the 
past but to the past itself: for as we saw a moment ago we should stricdy 
distinguish between 1) knowledge o f the past and 2) the remembrance o f 
the past. And the remembrance o f the past is not merely an insecure and 
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personalized form o f pseudo-knowledge, that we should always doubt 
because o f its uncertain foundations — the difference is, rather, that in 
remembrance the past itself persists in us and, therefore, still is present in 
ourselves. So, in the same way that we cannot say of the past itself that it is 
true or false — for the terms 'true' and 'false' are only applicable to what we 
say or write about the past - so it is with memory. I t may well be that our 
memory may make us say true or false things about tii_ past, but whatvte. say 
on the basis o f memory should be disdnguished from memory itself. And the 
crucial distincdon is, once again, that memory belongs to the world, more 
specifically to the world of the past, whereas speaking and writ ing, more 
speciftcally historical wridng, gives us knowledge about the world. I t therefore 
is a category mistake to criticize memory for its being unreliable — for this 
cridcism applies to the world (of the past) criteria that can only meaningfully 
be used for knowledge o f the wor ld . I n this way we can admire the 
appropriateness o f Nora's observation that historical writ ing achieves a 
'délégitimadon du passe vécu' . There is an intrinsic opposition between history, 
on the one hand, and memory or 'le passe vécu' , on the other. But we should 
not interpret this claim as expressing the victory o f sound historical knowledge 
over the vagaries o f memory. The claim expresses, rather, the shift from what 
we have knowledge o f — indeed, 'le passe vécu ' — to knowledge. 
Here, then, may we f ind the difference between memory and 
commemoradon on the one hand and historical writing on the other - or 
between a collection o f essays on Adam Smith published in 1976 and one 
thatis published in 1993. The aim of the 1993-collection simply is to contribute 
to our knowledge and understanding of Smith's writings; the 1776 - collecdon 
undoubtedly has this same aim, but, primarily, also to add a new dimension 
to the the past itself. A past has come into being that is richer than the one 
that we had before: we now carry along with us in the present the memory 
of Adam Smith and his Wealth of Nations, just as we carry along the memory 
of the history o f our nation or of World War I I . Historical writing adds to 
our knowledge o f the past, whereas commemoration enlarges the past itself. 
I t should be recognized, however, that in practice a clear and well-defined 
dividing line between the two cannot be drawn. The 1993-collection wil l 
inevitably have a commemorative dimension to it as well, whereas the 1776-
collection will also attempt to provide us with new insights in Smith's writings. 
A l i historical wr i t ing is, to a certain extent, commemorative; and ali 
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commemoration is, to a certain extent historical writing. But this is no argument 
against the distinction nor against the necessity o f making it. For as Ernest 
Nagel put it long ago, it may well be that we cannot pinpoint with absolute 
precision where our neck ends and our shoulder begins, but this is no argument 
against the meaningfulness of the distinction. I t is one o f our most fallacious 
and intellectually paralyzing beliefs that distinctions not permitting o f clear 
dividing lines should be abandoned (a fallacy which is, by the way, the lifeblood 
o f deconstructivism). 
Lastly, we wi l l now also understand why commemoration almost 
invariably goes together with a double de-contextualization that was discussed 
in the previous section. At first sight we might be tempted to discern in this 
de-contextualization a movement against history. For is contextualization not 
the hallmark and condidon o f ali historical understanding? We historicize, we 
understand historically, by contextualization. Hence, the de-contextualization 
o f commemora t ion appears to effect a relat ionship between the 
commemorated past, on the one hand, and ourselves, on the other, that is at 
odds with both the nature o f ali historical understanding and an openness to 
how the past actually has been. But this is a misunderstanding o f 
commemotation. For recall now that this de-contextualization had no other 
purpose than to create a clean corner on 'the slate of our memory' — a corner 
where now something new could be inscribed and that would respect better 
the authenticity o f the remembered or commemorated event than when 
new contents o f memory mingle with contents that were already present on 
the slate o f memory. In this way commemoradon wil l come closer to a 
'résurrection' of the past than we may ever expect from historical writing. 
Historical writing, by contextualizing the past, inevitably dissolves the authenticity 
of the past in the vagaries o f its 'Wirkungsgeschichte'. There is no more 
appropriate way for expressing this difference between historical wridng, on 
the one hand, and commemoradon on the other than by saying that historical 
writing may give us an understanding of the past, whereas commemoration 
will give us the past itself. 
7. CONCLUSION 
In the lengthy afterword Nora wrote for the huge series on the 'lieux de 
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mémoire ' edited by him, he spoke o f 'an acharnement commémoradf des 
deux ou trois dernières décennies ' 2 6 . Since the first ambitious commemorations 
o f the last few decades — that o f the two hundredth anniversary of the 
American Revolution and that of the French Revoludon thirteen years later — 
the stream o f commemorations gradually increased and would in the last 
ten to fifteen years erupt in a true deluge of commemorations. 
I f we ask ourselves how to interpret the coniemporray cult o f 
commemoration, two closely related considerations immediately come to 
mind. What must strike us in the first place is that commemoradon must 
invite a certain trivialfzation o f the past. Traditional historical writing always 
sought to transcend personal or group inspired oriented conceptions of the 
past — though, needless to say, it was far from being successful in this attempt. 
Nevertheless, one always aimed at some intersubjective and timeless historical 
truth. Commemoration, however does not aim at historical depth and truth; 
it is content with its superficiality. The banal and the trivial are openly and 
unashamedly welcomed. In the second place, commemoration re-emphasizes 
the place of the historical subject. Traditional historical writing always required 
of the historian to be absent himself from his writings: think o f Ranke's 'ich 
wünschte mein Selbst gleichsam aus zu lõschen' . But this is wholly different 
with commemorations: it is we who commemorate something and we 
commemorate the past only because o f what it means to us. Commemoration 
is hodiecentric. 
One would have expected that this abandonment o f supra-historical 
truth and the celebration o f the historical subject would have made 
commemoration into the plaything of ideology and o f political aims. And 
this expectadon is by no means incorrect, as we have seen when discussing 
above how powerfully commemoration contributed to the 'invention o f 
tradition'. But two considerations should be taken into account. The first is 
that historical writing has been no less the easy victim of ideology and political 
aims. Think of Michelet, think o f the historians of the Prussian school such as 
Treitschke, Sybel or Droysen, think o f Marxist historical writing. We need 
only recall examples such as these in order to realize ourselves the hypocrisy 
of those historians believing that historical writing is the selfevident censor of 
the irresponsible effusions of commemoration. And this brings me to a second 
consideration. For the truth of the matteris that ordinarilyit were the historians 
themselves who most powerfully contributed to the politicizarion o f 
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commemoration. The politicization of the past began with historical writing 
and from there it triclded down into commemoration. Moreover, Nora offers 
an amazing argument suggesting that commemoration is intrinsically a-political 
rather than political. He observes that commemoration is most often inspired 
by the preoccupadon of individuais and of individual groups, whereas the 
state, as the incorporadon of (national) polidcs, often is the outsider in 
commemoradon. O f course the state also celebrates its commemorations, 
but as we have seen, these nadonal commemoradons tend to be overgrown 
by sendments that have litde or nothing to do with the occasion itself of a 
commemoration. They are like these statues in large cities to which everybody 
attaches his or her own personal associations and that ordinarily have litde or 
nothing to do with the person or event that is honored by the statue. In this 
way, the commemoration exemplifies, perhaps better than anything else, what 
one may describe as 'the privatization of the past'2'. 
As Nora puts it, commemoration 'est devenu, pour chacun des groupes 
concernes, le fil dissemine dans le tissu social qui leur permettra, au present à 
établir un court-circuit avec un passe définitivement mort'. The national and 
political past is dead, and has now been replaced by the many individual 
relationships to the past of individuais and o f individual groups. Just as 
traditional poütics died in the dissemination, or 'displacement of polidcs', so 
did the the politicized past o f traditional nationalist historical writing dissolve 
into how individuais and individual groups like to imagine their past. In this 
sense the contemporary cult o f commemoration testifies to this death of 
polidcs that has been observed and apprehensively discussed by so many 
contemporary political theorists. We can therefore agree with CS. Maier when 
he writes that 'the surfeit of memory is as sign not of historical confidence 
but o f a retreat from transformative politics' 2 8. 
This privatization o f the past does also have its consequences for 
commemoration itself: the commemorations originating in, or stimulated by 
the political center wil l more and more lose their power over the people 
while the periphery will become the natural locus o f ali commemorative 
desire. And here we may find, once again, a striking illustrarion of Tocqueville's 
capacity for prophedc insight into the sociology o f democracy. For precisely 
this-he predicted.already in 1839 for that other paradigmatic 'lieu de mémoire ' , 
the statue: 'ainsi, la démocrat ie ne porte pas seulement à faire une multitude 
de menus ouvrages (i.e. o f small statues [F.A.]); elle les porte aussi à élever un 
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petit nombre de três grands monuments. Mais entre ces deux extremes, i l n'y 
a rien'2' J. So it has primarily been democracy, and the de-politicizing potentialies 
of democracy, that produced this movement away from the political center 
and towards the priority o f the local over the national commemoration. 
'L'histoire s'est prodigieusement d i s séminée ' 3 0 as Nora puts it, and the vicissi-
tudes of the commemoration exemplify this process. 
But the strained relationship between commemoration and historical 
writing obeys a different logic. Crucial here is, as we have seen, that historical 
writing is to be associated with knowledge o f the past and commemoration 
rather than with the past itself. By its very nature knowledge o f the past is a 
more helpless and vulnerable victim of polidcizadon than past reality itself. 
Political ideologies are themselves already partly organizations of knowledge 
of the past and can therefore more easily be infected by ideology than the 
past itself. Reality itself is supremely indifferent to what we may, or may not 
write about it, whether inspired by political ideologies or not. Surely, there is 
a political dimension to what parts or aspects o f the past we will be interested 
in — and this is why commemoration also could play its role in the 'invention 
of tradition' and in the formation o f national identity. But even here it followed 
historical wridng rather than guiding it. So i f Nora is right when claiming that 
'le modele memorial l'a emporté sur le modele historique'3 1 we can observe 
in this a pardal victory o f the past itself over historical writing. 
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always be distinguished from that of B. We cannot remember the memories of other 
persons even if the memories of other persons are, qua content, exactly the same as our 
own. See for an analogous argument Lowenthal, Past, 195. 
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2 2 See for this the last chapter of my History andtropology, Berkeley 1994. 
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France. 3: De Farchive à 1'emblème, Paris 1992; 983. For further details on the contemporary 
cult of commemoration, see also WJ. Johnston, Postmodemisme et millénaire: le culte des 
anniversaires dans la culture contemporaine, Paris 1992. 
2 7 For this privatization of the past, see my 'Die postmoderne "Privatisierung"der 
Vergangenheit', in H . Nagl-Docekal Hrsgb., Der Sinn des Historischen. 
Geschichtsphilosophische Debatten, Frankfurt am Main 1996; 201 - 235. 
2 8 CS. Maier, A surfeit of memory, History and Memory. Studies in the representation of the 
past 5 (1993); 150. Maier also sees an intimate relationship between the contemporary 
interest for memory and the loss of projects that are supported by ali of society: 'why, 
to return to the question that motivated this discussion of public commemoration, 
does memory now seem to play a larger role in political and civic life? My own belief is 
that at the end of the twentieth century Western societies have come to an end of a 
massive collective project'(p. 147). 
2 9 A. de Tocqueville, De la démocratie enAmêrique. Vol. II, Paris 1981; 69. And because of 
its aristocratic past Europes possesses far more monuments than the US, as is amusingly 
observed by Donald Barthelme: 'every tacky little fourth-rate déclassé European country 
has monuments ali over the place and one cannot turn a corner without banging into an 
eighteen-foot bronze of Lebrouche tickling the Chambermaids at Vache while planning 
the Battle of Bledsoe, or some such'. Quoted in Lowenthal, Past, 322. 
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R E S U M O : Vivemos em uma era de comemorações . Comemoração 
exprime ou exemplifica o sendmento que possuímos, ou que se supõe 
que devamos ter, acerca de um evento do passado, e cuja origem está 
em nós e não no passado em si mesmo. Comemoração se apresenta a 
nós em um t r íp t i co s e m â n t i c o : a r e m e m o r a ç ã o a si mesmo, a 
rememoração de alguma coisa e a comemoração , situada entre as duas 
formas de r ememoração . O repensar, o reviver como formas de 
c o m e m o r a ç ã o , suas origens no campo da r e l i g i ã o , sua 
d e s c o n t e x t u a l i z a ç ã o , os processos de sua p r i v a t i z a ç ão e de sua 
apropriação pela autoridade, assim como sua contraposição à análise 
historiográfica levam a refletir sobre a (pseudo)oposição entre memória 
e história. 
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